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ABSTRACT 
 
Because of the trust’s advantages in investment, banking, financing and 
property management, China took the bold step of introducing the trust in 2001. 
However, as a product of equitable jurisdiction, the trust seemed to be alien to 
Chinese law, and seemed particularly inconsistent with the Chinese property system. 
Therefore, China went down a tortuous road upon its introduction of trusts before 
eventually promulgating the Trust Law of China in 2001. However, the Trust Law of 
China deliberately leaves open the fundamental question of the introduction of dual 
ownership of trust property, which results in a number of limitations in the Chinese 
legislation. For instance, the ambiguous ownership of trust property and the 
outstanding nature of the beneficiary’s rights all bedevil efforts to analyse Chinese 
trust law. In this paper, the author first investigates the history of trust in China and 
Legal Reforms of Chinese Trust Business. Based on this analysis, the following 
section presents a detailed examination of the Trust Law of China and the 
limitations of the Chinese trust system. 
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This paper outlines the basic features of the Chinese trust with a view to 
showing how these features put in place the essential elements of a trust as 
seen in international practice, and highlights the theoretical and practical 
challenges of the Chinese approach. It includes three sections: 1. History of 
Trusts in China, Legal Reforms of Chinese Trust Business, and the Drafting 
of Trust Law of People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 
Trust Law of China);1 2. Regulations of the Trust Law of China; and 3. 
Uncertainties of the Chinese Trust System. 
 
I. HISTORY OF TRUSTS IN CHINA, LEGAL REFORMS OF CHINESE TRUST 
BUSINESS, AND THE DRAFTING OF THE TRUST LAW OF CHINA 
 
The notion of trusts never found root in dynastic China. Inheritance was 
predominantly regulated by customary law, and there was little room for 
testamentary disposition by individuals. Therefore, a trust-like device was 
not needed for property owners to entrust the management of their property 
to others.2 Starting from 1911 however, when dynastic rule ended and the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) took over control of the country, the 
so-called trust business was operated by trust institutions. At the beginning 
and lasting until the communist victory in the Civil War, trust institutions 
were set up inside banks in the form of a department of trust. For example, in 
1919, the Shanghai branch of Ju Xing Cheng Bank established the 
department of trust to manage trust business. In addition to the trust 
institutions within banks, several governmental trust institutions were also 
enacted, such as the Central Trust Bureau and Shanghai Xingye Trust. With 
them came regulation, an example being the two significant trust rules 
promulgated by the Central Trust Bureau in 1945: the Issuing Measures of 
Securities and Trust and Regulations of Issuing Investment Trust and 
Securities.3 Finally, a third type of trust institution was broadly adopted at 
that time, and still exists as a major use of trust in China: “the trust 
company”. In August 1921, the first trust company, Tongshang Trust 
Company of China was established in Shanghai; and quickly within the next 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa (中华人民共和国信托法) [Trust Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm’ Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 28, 2001, 
effective Oct. 1, 2001), 2001(4) STANDING COMM’ NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 311 (China) 
[hereinafter Trust Law of China]. 
 2. Lusina Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, Ambiguity and Beneficiary’s Rights, in RE-IMAGINING 
THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 183, 186-87 (Lionel Smith ed., 2012). 
 3. WU HONG (吴弘), JIA XILING (贾希凌) & CHENG SHENG (程胜), XINTUO FA LUN–ZHONGGUO 
XINTUO SHICHANG FAYU FAZHAN DE FALU TIAOZHENG (信托法论－中囯信托市场发育发展的法
律调整) [TRUST LAW: LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA TRUST MARKET] 
25-26 (2003). 
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month, twelve similar trust companies4 sprang up in China.5 
These trust companies came to a halt after the Communist takeover in 
1949. They obtained a new lease of life in 1979, when China adopted an 
open-door policy for foreign trade and investment. The trust companies 
provided the government with flexible avenues for financing outside the 
rigid state-planned budget.6 The first trust and investment company of the 
People’s Republic of China, China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation, was established with the approval of State Council in Beijing 
on October 4th, 1979.7 From 1979 to 1988, a number of provinces, cities 
and financial institutions set up their own trust and investment companies 
and the number of trust and investment companies rose up to more than one 
thousand. 8  This period also saw the introduction of a new form of 
commercial trust, the collective capital trust, only operable by trust 
companies.9 Moreover, charitable trusts were also established in this period. 
The first charitable trust, the Soong Ching Ling Foundation, was formed in 
1982. Over the following decade, a number of these kinds of trusts were 
rapidly established. In order to regulate these charitable trusts, State Council 
promulgated the Regulations for the Management of Foundations 10  in 
September 1988.11 
As the flexibility of trusts in managing the assets of others has been 
recognized in common law jurisdictions, China sought to develop its legal 
infrastructure to include trusts. As the 1980s wore on, this project acquired 
new urgency: with the development of international trade and the growth of 
private wealth in China after its economic reforms, China was keen to adopt 
the trust as a means of establishing a modern system for the fiduciary 
management of assets.12 Nevertheless, due to the lack of adequate legal 
                                                                                                                            
 4. The 12 trust companies are Zhongyi, Zhongguo, Shangye, Tongyi, Dazhonghua, Zhongyang, 
Shanghai, Tongshang, Shenzhou, Zhongwai, Huasheng, and Shanghai Yunshi. 
 5. HUO YUFEN (霍玉芬), XINTUO FA YAOLUN (信托法要论) [SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS OF TRUST 
LAW] 27-28 (2003). 
 6. Id. at 28-29. 
 7. GUAN JINGXIN (关景欣), ZHONGGUO XINTUO FALU CAOZUO SHIWU (中国信托法律操作实
务) [TRUST LAW PRACTICE IN CHINA] 25 (2008). 
 8. TANG JINSHU (汤津姝) & CHAO RAN (赵然), JINRONG XINTUO YU JINRONG SHICHANG (金融
信託與金融市場) [FINANCIAL TRUST AND FINANCIAL MARKET] 29 (1990). 
 9. Lusina Ho, Rebecca Lee & Jin Jinping, Trust Law in China: A Critical Evaluation of Its 
Conceptual Foundation, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 80, 80 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013). 
 10. Jijinhuei Guali Banfa (基金会管理办法) [Regulations for the Management of Foundations] 
(promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Sept. 27, 1988, abolished Jun. 1, 
2004) (Lawinfochina) (China). It was replaced by Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli (基金会管理条例) 
[Regulation on Foundation Administration] (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China Jun. 1, 2004) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
 11. HUO, supra note 5, at 29-30. 
 12. Qi Dan (漆丹) & Yan Lin (晏琳), Xiandai Xintuo Gongneng Zaitan (現代信托功能再探) 
[Restudy of the Functions of Modern Trust], 2005: 4 J. OF SHAOYANG UNI. SOC. SCI. 44 (2005). 
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norms and theoretical supports, the trust developed in an unusual way. Due 
to the government’s active promotion of this form of fiduciary management, 
Chinese trusts rapidly over-expanded, as the trust and investment companies 
operated an excessively broad scope of business, including traditional 
banking activities such as the management of retail and corporate loans and 
deposits.13 More specifically, the trust companies engaged in trust loans, 
trust investments and trust deposits, activities which were effectively 
deposit-taking activities authorized by the lack of legal requirements for the 
segregation of investor and trustee funds. Whatever profits or losses accrued 
went to the trust and investment companies rather than to the customers.14 
Facing this highly irregular expansion of trusts, the Chinese government 
tried to correct its inappropriate promotion and to regulate trust business via 
legal reforms, i.e. a series of “rectifications” dating from 1988 to 1998 in 
which trust institutions were separated from banks.15 The number of trust 
and investment companies was reduced to two hundred and thirty-nine by 
the end of 1998. The fifth, and most significant rectification, took place 
1998, when the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation 
was acquired by the People’s Bank of China (hereinafter referred to as 
PBC)16 and forced into liquidation. A further culling of companies with 
                                                                                                                            
 13. GUAN, supra note 7, at 11. 
 14. Ho, supra note 2, at 188-89. 
 15. Su Dongsheng (苏东升), Xintuo Yu Shuishou (信託與稅收) [Trusts and Taxes], 2006(11) 
SHIDAI JINRONG (时代金融) [TIMES FINANCE] 67 (2006). 
 16. The People’s Bank of China was established on Dec. 1, 1948 based on the consolidation of 
the Huabei Bank, the Beihai Bank and the Xibei Farmer Bank. In Sept. 1983, the State Council 
decided to have the PBC function as a central bank. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongguo Renmin 
Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国中国人民银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
People’s Bank of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm’ Nat’l People’s Cong. and effective 
March. 18, 1995) (Lawinfochina) has since legally confirmed the PBC’s central bank status. With the 
improvement of the socialist market economic system, the PBC, as a central bank, will play an even 
more important role in China’s macroeconomic management. The amended Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国中国人民银行法) [Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm’ Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004) (Lawinfochina) provides that the PBC performs 
the following major functions: (1) Drafting and enforcing relevant laws, rules and regulations that are 
related to fulfilling its functions; (2) Formulating and implementing monetary policy in accordance 
with law; (3) Issuing the Renminbi and administering its circulation; (4) Regulating financial markets, 
including the inter-bank lending market, the inter-bank bond market, foreign exchange market and 
gold market; (5) Preventing and mitigating systemic financial risks to safeguard financial stability; (6) 
Maintaining the Renminbi exchange rate at adaptive and equilibrium level; Holding and managing the 
state foreign exchange and gold reserves; (7) Managing the State treasury as fiscal agent; (8) Making 
payment and settlement rules in collaboration with relevant departments and ensuring normal 
operation of the payment and settlement systems; (9) Providing guidance to anti-money laundering 
work in the financial sector and monitoring money-laundering related suspicious fund movement; (10) 
Developing statistics system for the financial industry and responsible for the consolidation of 
financial statistics as well as the conduct of economic analysis and forecast; (11) Administering credit 
reporting industry in China and promoting the building up of credit information system; (12) 
Participating in international financial activities at the capacity of the central bank; (13) Engaging in 
financial business operations in line with relevant rules; (14) Performing other functions prescribed by 
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payment difficulties, insufficient assets, or poor management, reduced the 
number of trust and investment companies to fifty-eight.17 
The experience of the four rectifications had become one of the primary 
reasons for initiating the drafting of the Trust Law of China in 1993.18 In 
other words, the Trust Law of China aimed at regulating trust business.19 
After three years of efforts, the working group proposed a draft on 
November 29, 1996, which included six chapters: general provisions, the 
relationship between trust parties, special provisions of charitable trust, trust 
companies, legal liabilities of trust, and supplementary provisions. 20 
Nevertheless, how exactly China regulates trust companies is a subject that 
still needs further research. For the purposes of this paper however, suffice it 
to note that, since the supervision of the trust business should be governed 
by public law, the specific way in which the trust industry is governed is 
ontologically separate from the laws surrounding the institution of trust. This 
fact is recognized in other civilian jurisdictions such as Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan.21 The Law Committee of National People’s Congress revised 
the legislative purpose of the Trust Law of China to regulate the relationship 
between trust parties and deleted the provisions regarding trust companies in 
the draft.22 
After almost eight years of drafting, China promulgated the Trust Law of 
China (the third draft) on 28 April 2001. The act came into effect on 1 
October 2001,23 making China one of the first socialist and civil law 
jurisdictions to have introduced a domestic law of trusts. This trust law has 
attracted much attention, both in China and overseas. “First, [because] there 
is much hope in China that the Law will put in place an important legal 
instrument for the professional management of assets and, ultimately, for 
modernizing China’s financial infrastructure. Second, [because] the Chinese 
experiment might be useful to civil law jurisdictions generally as an 
illustration of how thorny issues regarding the reception of the common law 
                                                                                                                            
the State Council. 
 17. GUAN, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
 18. Before the Trust Law of China, the Chinese trust was regulated by the Jinrong Xintuo Touzi 
Jigou Guanli Zhanxing Guiding (金融信托投资机构管理暂行规定) [Provisional Regulations on the 
Management of Financial Trust Investment Institutions] promulgated in Apr. 1986 and the Zhongguo 
Renmin Yinhang Jinrong Xintuo Touzi Jigou Zijin Guanli Zhanxing Banfa (中国人民银行金融信托
投资机构资金管理暂行办法) [Provisional Regulations on the Capital Management of Financial 
Trust Investment Institutions] promulgated in Dec. 1986.  
 19. ZHOU XIAOMING (周小明), XINTUO ZHIDU: FALI YU SHIWU (信托制度：法理与实务) 
[TRUST LEGISLATION: THEORIES AND PRACTICE] 24 (2012). 
 20. Id. at 24-25. 
 21. WU, JIA & CHENG, supra note 3, at 41. 
 22. ZHOU, supra note 19, at 25, 27. 
 23. China is not a party to the Hague Convention. Therefore the Trust Law of China contains no 
provision on choice of law rules and it is applicable to trust activities carried out in China. 
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trust can be tackled,”24 analysts have been examining the law upon a 
number of grounds. It is worth noting that when the Trust Law of China was 
drafted, the initial and most typical kind of trust existing in China was the 
commercial trust used as a mechanism to facilitate investment, financing and 
property management, not the trust that used for management of 
intergenerational wealth. Therefore, as shown in the history of the 
development of trusts in China, trusts created by wills can barely be found in 
Chinese law. 
In addition to the Trust Law of China, further legislation and regulations 
have been passed to provide for the use of the trust in financial arrangements 
focusing on the regulation of trust and investment companies. 25  For 
example, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities Investment 
Funds,26 The Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies,27 and 
The Rules for Administration of Collective Capital Trust Plans.28 Thanks to 
its these laws and regulations, China’s trust business has rapidly developed: 
its total revenue has increased from RMB 21.9 billion in 2007 to 63.8 billion 
in 2012 (an increase of 191.32%), and total industry profits have increased 
from 15.8 billion in 2007 to 44.1 billion in 2012 (an increase of 179.11%).29  
 
II. REGULATIONS OF THE TRUST LAW OF CHINA AND THEIR UNCERTAINTIES 
 
From these notions of the history of trusts in China, it is not hard to see 
that China has gone through a number of difficulties in introducing trusts, 
and that its notion of trust has evolved differently from common law’s 
conception of trust.  
The Trust Law of China is comprised of seventy-four articles in seven 
                                                                                                                            
 24. LUSINA HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA 2 (2003). 
 25. GAO LINGYUN (高凌云), BEI WUDU DE XINTUO—XINTUO FA YUANLUN (被误读的信托—
信托法原论) [THE MISUNDERSTOOD TRUST: PRINCIPLES ON TRUST LAW] 277 (2010). 
 26. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Touzi Jijin Fa (中华人民共和国证券投资基金
法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds] (Adopted at the fifth 
Session of the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., promulgated by Order No. 9 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China on Oct. 28, 2003, and effective as of Jun. 1, 2004) (Lawinfochina) (China).  
 27. Xintuo Gongsi Guanli Banfa (信托公司管理办法) [The Measures for the Administration of 
Trust Companies] (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm. Jan. 23, 2007, effective 
Mar. 1, 2007, amended Dec. 17, 2008) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
 28. Xintuo Gongsi Jihe Zijin Xintuo Jihua Guanli Banfa (信托公司集合资金信托计划管理办
法) [The Rules for Administration of Collective Capital Trust Plans] (promulgated by the China 
Banking Regulatory Comm. Jan. 23, 2007, effective Mar. 1, 2007, amended Dec. 17, 2008) 
(Lawinfochina) (China). 
 29. ZHIXIN ZICHAN GUANLI YANJIUYUAN (智信资产管理研究院 ), ZICHAN GUANLI 
LANPISHU–ZHONGGUO XINTUO YE FAZHAN BAOGAO (2013): DA ZICHAN GUANLI SHIDAI DE 
XINTUO YE (资产管理蓝皮书－中国信托业发展报告中國信託業發展報告（2013）：大资产管理
时代的信托业) [BLUE BOOK OF ASSET MANAGEMENT: ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CHINA’S TRUST INDUSTRY (2013)] 89-90 (2013). 
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chapters. General provisions are found in Chapter I (articles 1 to 5), the 
creation of the trust in Chapter II (articles 6 to 13), trust property in Chapter 
III (articles 14 to 18); regulations concerning the trust parties – settlor, 
trustee and beneficiary – in Chapter IV (articles 19 to 49), modification to 
and termination of a trust in Chapter V (articles 50 to 58), and the charitable 
trust in Chapter VI (articles 59 to 73). Supplementary provisions are found in 
the last chapter (article 74). This section provides a detailed examination of 
the provisions of the Trust Law of China, focusing on the regulations of 
Chapter IV, i.e. the rights and obligations of the settlor, trustee and 
beneficiary. 
Chapter I, article 2 defines the trust as a situation where “the settlor, 
based on his faith in trustee, entrusts his property rights to the trustee and 
allows the trustee to, according to the will of the settlor and in the name of 
the trustee, administer or dispose of such property in the interest of a 
beneficiary or for any intended purposes.”30 It stipulates the property right 
of the trustee as a wider legal definition of the notion of property where it 
relates to the ownership of property to competing rights. It embraces real 
property, the interest arising from a real property and personal property.31 In 
order to facilitate the management and administration of the trust, the main 
purpose of the Trust Law of China is to “regulate trust relationship, to 
standardize trust acts, [and] to protect the lawful rights and interests of the 
parties involved in a trust.”32 Therefore, Chapter IV, adopting many articles, 
stipulates the legal rights and obligations of the settlors, trustees, and 
beneficiaries. 
 
A. Rights and Obligations of the Settlor 
 
This section examines the Chinese regulations of the rights and 
obligations of the settlor, points out its unique provisions, and analyzes the 
reasons for these provisions as well as problems arising from these 
provisions. 
In the Trust Law of China, a settlor is defined as “a natural person, a 
legal person, or an organization established in accordance with law that has 
full capability for civil conduct.”33、34 The settlor is conferred a broad 
                                                                                                                            
 30. Trust Law of China § 2. 
 31. MARK HSIAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION OF BANKING DERIVATIVES, SECURITIZATIONS AND 
TRUSTS IN CHINA 224 (2009). 
 32. Trust Law of China § 1. 
 33. Id. § 19. 
 34. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongtze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [General Principle 
of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm’ Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), 1986 STANDING COMM’ NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 3, § 11 (China). The article states the definition of natural person with full capability for civil 
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information power which allows him to access “the administration, use and 
disposition of, and the income and expenses relating to, his trust property 
[and] to request the trustee to give explanations in this regard. [He also has] 
the right to check, transcribe or duplicate the trust accounts related to his 
trust property and other documents drawn up in the course of dealing with 
trust business”.35 
Moreover, the settlor is given the power to ask the trustee to modify his 
administration when the methods for the administration “are not favorable to 
the realization of trust purposes or do not conform to the interests of the 
beneficiary [or] due to special reasons unexpected at the time the trust is 
created”.36 Article 22 provides a similar remedy of restitution to the settlor, 
allowing him to annul the trustee’s disposition and restore trust property 
when the trustee disposes of the trust property in breach of the purposes of 
the trust, or causes losses to the trust property due to his departure from his 
administrative duties or improper handling of trust business. In these cases, it 
is the settlor who can “apply to the People’s Court for annulling such 
disposition [and] to ask the trustee to restore the property to its former state 
or make compensation.”37 While this right is subject to statutory limitations, 
it has to be exercised “within one year beginning from the date [the settlor] 
comes to know or should have known the reason for annulling the 
disposition, [otherwise] such right shall cease to exist”.38 Alternatively, the 
settlor also has the right to “dismiss the trustee according to the provisions in 
the trust documents or apply to the People’s Court for dismissing him”.39 In 
relation to charitable trusts, the settlor can file a lawsuit at the People’s Court 
when “the public welfare administration authority violates” the provisions of 
the Trust Law of China.40 
The settlor is also granted the powers to resolve uncertainties or disputes 
relating to the administration of the trust. In the absence of a provision in the 
trust instrument, the settlor has the right to give consent to transactions 
conducted by the trustee between his own property and trust assets at fair 
                                                                                                                            
conduct that “a citizen aged 18 or over shall be an adult. He shall have full capacity for civil conduct, 
may independently engage in civil activities and shall be called a person with full capacity for civil 
conduct. A citizen who has reached the age of 16 but not the age of 18 and whose main source of 
income is his own labor shall be regarded as a person with full capacity for civil conduct.” The 
definition of legal person is found in § 37 of the General Principles of Civil Law, stating that: “A legal 
person shall have the following qualifications: (1) establishment in accordance with the law; (2) 
possession of the necessary property or funds; (3) possession of its own name, organization and 
premises; and (4) ability to independently bear civil liability”. 
 35. Trust Law of China § 20. 
 36. Id. § 21. 
 37. Id. § 22. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. § 23. 
 40. Id. § 73. 
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market price, 41  to resolve disagreements between joint trustees in the 
administration of trust,42 or to enter into a supplementary agreement with 
the trustee and the beneficiary to authorize remuneration to the trustee.43 He 
can also consent to the trustee’s resignation44 or to appoint a new trustee 
after termination of the trustee’s appointment. 45  Moreover, upon the 
termination of the trust, as a consequence of the trustee’s removal, 
bankruptcy, loss of legal qualifications, resignation, dismissal or other 
circumstances stipulated in laws or administrative regulations, the settlor has 
the right to approve the report submitted by the trustee on his administration 
of the trust.46  
Additionally, it is even possible for the settlor to terminate the trust 
through consultation with the trustee and beneficiary.47 Alternatively, when 
the settlor is the trust’s sole beneficiary, and in the absence of provision in 
the trust instrument, he can revoke the trust himself.48 Moreover, according 
to article 51, “the settlor may replace the beneficiary or dispose of his right 
to benefit from the trust under one of the following circumstances: (1) the 
beneficiary commits a major tort against the settlor; (2) the beneficiary 
commits a major tort against the other co-beneficiaries; (3) the change or 
disposition wins the consent of the beneficiary; and (4) other circumstances 
stipulated in the trust documents.”49 Upon termination of the settlor is also 
entitled to receive the trust property in secondary priority after the 
beneficiary and his successors.50 
It is worth noting that some of the settlor’s rights are uniquely regulated 
in Chinese law and have been questioned by jurists. In particular, article 2 of 
the Trust Law of China allows for the possibility of title to trust property 
being held by the settlor, rather than by the trustee. This possibility is totally 
unknown in common law and is highly unusual internationally. Likewise, the 
settlor’s right to replace the beneficiary, given by article 51, usually does not 
exist in common law unless the settlor expressly reserved such right in trust 
documents. Moreover, the settlor’s right to supervise the trust’s management 
and administration, or to modify or even annul the trustees’ disposition of 
trust property, enunciated in articles 20, 21 and 22, is usually not to be found 
in common law jurisdictions either, because the settlor automatically loses 
those rights when he transfers the trust property to others. As Ho explains, 
                                                                                                                            
 41. Id. § 28. 
 42. Id. § 31. 
 43. Id. § 35. 
 44. Id. § 38. 
 45. Id. § 40. 
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[i]n relation to self-dealing transactions, given that any harm or 
loss will be suffered by the beneficiaries rather than the 
settlors, it is difficult to see why the latter should be given the 
right to authorize such transactions. [Moreover,] it is not 
inconceivable that a settlor who has settled property upon trust 
may wish to revoke his or her gift. The risk of giving powers to 
the settlor as above is that he or she may exercise these powers 
arbitrarily, or in preference for his or her own rather than the 
beneficiaries’ interests.51  
 
The unique regulations of the settlor’s rights imply that most Chinese 
trusts are alter ego trusts.52 However, when the settlor is not the sole 
beneficiary, granting the same rights to both settlors and beneficiaries, or 
more specifically, retaining the beneficiary’s rights as to settlors, as regulated 
in article 49, will cause conflicts between those two parties. Although these 
conflicts can be solved by the court, the efficiency of the trust’s management 
will be decreased. Even though the trust contract may restrict the settlor’s 
act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, such restrictions operate 
only at the level of obligation and do not invalidate juridical acts. 53 
Therefore, the Chinese legislation grants too much power to the settlors and 
fails to provide sufficient restraints on the powers: It decreases the efficiency 
of trust management, increases the cost of trust administration, and confuses 
the trust with other legal institutions such as agency. While in other legal 
systems the trust, at least in comparison to other institutions has the 
advantage of being able to allow the trustee to manage the trust property in 
his own name and be immune from the interference of others, the current 
Chinese system reduces this advantage, and, consequently, weakens the 
attractions of the trust.54 
 
B. Rights and Duties of the Trustee 
 
In this section, the author first indicates the trustee’s capacity, as well as 
the situations for the trustee needed to assign duties and resign. After that, 
the author will present a detailed analysis of the obligations and rights of the 
trustee. 
In Chinese law, “[a] trustee shall be a natural person or legal person who 
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has full capability for civil conduct.”55  Unlike settlors, unincorporated 
organizations cannot be trustees. The original trustee of the trust is appointed 
by the settlor upon the entry into the trust contract or the trustee’s acceptance 
of the trust.56 Under the Trust Law of China, a trustee may be removed only 
under limited circumstances, specifically “[w]here the trustee disposes of the 
trust property against the purposes of the trust or commits gross negligence 
in administering, using or disposing of the trust property”.57 In addition, 
Chinese trust law only leaves an extremely limited scope for a trustee to 
resign, which is considered to restrict the trustee’s power.58 The trustee 
cannot resign in the absence of the consent of the settlor and beneficiary, 
even when there are enough trustees to manage the trust.59 It is unclear 
whether this stipulation is mandatory or can be overridden by express 
provision in the trust instrument. This is different from the common law 
regulation where the trustee has the discretion to resign. Moreover, while 
most of the jurisdictions give the court power to permit a trustee to resign, no 
such provision can be found under the Trust Law of China. When the 
trustees’ appointment can be terminated according to article 39, the trust 
property will be kept on hold ad hoc until a new trustee is appointed.60 In 
the case of joint trustees, if some of the trustees’ appointments are 
terminated, the other trustees will continue the administration.61  
 
1. Trustee’s Duties 
 
In managing the trust property for the beneficiary’s interests, the trustees 
“have the obligation to pay the beneficiary benefits from the trust with the 
limits of the trust property”.62  
(a) The Regulations of Fiduciary Duties and Their Limitations 
The Trust Law of China enumerates the fiduciary duties of trustees. 
Article 25 states that “[t]he trustee shall abide by the provisions in the trust 
documents and handle trust business for the best interests of the beneficiary; 
[and] in administering the trust property, the trustee shall be careful in 
performing his duties and fulfill his obligations with honesty, good faith, 
prudence and efficiency.”63 However, at least one Chinese commentator 
argues that this provision reduces the standard of trustee’s duty from that 
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required from the good administrator to that of a normal administrator taking 
care of his own property.64 This compares unfavorably with the Chinese 
trust’s common law counterparts, which generally subjects all trustees to 
general duty of care and prudence while also taking into account the 
knowledge and experience of individual trustees. These jurisdictions thus 
place demand a more rigorous duty of care from professional trustees.65 
Furthermore, there is no elaboration in article 25 or other provisions that 
explain what standard of prudence is expected from the trustee, and whether 
the standard varies depending on the type of trust involved. In this light, it is 
suggested that the Chinese law should be amended with reference to other 
jurisdictions and include a specific explanation of the standard of trustees’ 
duty of care. 
In addition to the general rule of the fiduciary duties in article 25, the 
Trust Law of China also lists other specific obligations of the trustee. It 
provides that “except obtaining remuneration according to the provisions of 
this Law, the trustee may not seek interests for himself by using the trust 
property” 66  or “convert the trust property into his own property”. 67 
Additionally, the trustee is prohibited from self-dealing or merging the trust 
property with his personal property. As it states, the trustee may not make 
transactions “between his own property and trust assets or between the 
trust’s assets of different settlors, unless it is otherwise stipulated in the trust 
documents.”68 The trustee “shall administer the trust property separately 
from his own property and keep separate accounting books, and he shall do 
the same with regard to the trust property of different settlors”.69 These 
regulations comply with the rule of the independence of the trust property 
and prevent the trust property from falling into the hands of trustees’ 
personal creditors.70 It provides that the trust property comprises the initial 
settled property, and property lawfully and unlawfully obtained from the use, 
management or disposal of the initial property.71 Furthermore, despite the 
absence of express stipulation in the Trust Law of China, it is implied in 
article 25 that the trustee should also be prohibited from engaging in any 
business in competition with the trust. 
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However, the Chinese provisions of the trustee’s fiduciary duties seem 
to be vague, and there are both gaps and overlaps in the provisions as 
compared to systematic and comprehensive regulations in common law. The 
Trust Law of China only stipulates the general rules of fiduciary duties in 
article 25 in very broad terms and provides a sporadic list of specific 
fiduciary duties. It is unclear whether a trustee has any fiduciary duties in 
situations that are not specially regulated. Moreover, Chinese law does not 
recognize the duty of impartiality, given that most of the trusts in China are 
short-term, alter ego trusts with no complicated conflicts of interests existing 
between the beneficiaries. 72  Another outstanding issue, or gap in the 
regulation of fiduciary duties, is the burden of proof. The Trust Law of China 
has no provision stating how the burden of proof should be allocated. 
According to article 64 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (hereinafter referred to as Civil Procedure Law of China)73, it 
would be the duty of settlors or beneficiaries as the claimant to provide 
evidence in support of his allegations against the fiduciary. This would be 
extremely difficult in practice for the settlors or beneficiaries to prove that 
the trustee has not acted in the best interest of the beneficiaries.74 Therefore, 
an express provision should be regulated in Chinese trust law to shift the 
burden of proof to trustees in order to show that they indeed have acted in 
the best interest of the beneficiaries. 
As to the problem of overlaps in the provisions, an example can be 
found in article 22. It states that “[w]here the trustee disposes of the trust 
property in breach of the purposes of the trust, or causes losses to the trust 
property due to his departure from his administrative duties or improper 
handling of trust business, [he shall] restore the property to its former state 
or make compensation.” 75  However, the duty of “departure from his 
administrative duties” involves an “improper handling of trust business”, 
thus creating an overlap and potential conflict. As if to add to the confusion, 
these two phrases are not defined, creating difficulties in the implementation 
of the law. For instance, it is unclear whether an improper handling arises 
when the trustee has not breached any specific duty but has nonetheless 
caused loss to the trust property, such as when he has made an unprofitable 
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investment. 
(b) The Regulations of Duty to Act Personally and their Limitations  
In addition to the fiduciaries duties, the trustee is also required to act 
personally when carrying out the trust’s business. According to article 30, 
“[t]he trustee shall handle trust business himself.”76 With regard to this duty, 
questions arise as to when the delegation should be allowed, what duties a 
trustee owes in the delegation, and when the trustee should be liable for the 
acts of a third party. As to the first question, delegation under the Trust Law 
of China is essentially allowed on the ground of necessity, i.e. for when the 
trustee “has to do so for reasons beyond his control [or] where the trust 
documents provide otherwise”.77 This regulation is much more restrictive 
than the common law approach that permits delegation on the ground of 
prudence or simply grants a general power of delegation to the trustees. For 
example, the Trustee Act 2000 of England and Wales provides that “[a] 
trustee is not liable for any act or default of the agent, nominee or custodian 
unless he has failed to comply with the duty of care applicable to him.”78 
“Given the increasing sophistication and specialization of modern 
commercial transactions, it is submitted that a broad power of delegation 
ought to be granted to trustees.”79 The Chinese approach runs a serious risk 
of hindering the trustee’s administration of the trust. 
With respect to the second question, Chinese law is silent. Nevertheless, 
in order to prevent trustees from abandoning their duties through provided 
delegation, it ought to be a given that the trustees should exercise due care 
and skill in appointing and supervising the agent. This is a position adopted 
by most jurisdictions. As to the third question, namely when should a trustee 
be liable for the acts of a third party, the Chinese law provides in article 30 
that the trustee “shall bear the responsibility for the acts committed by that 
person in handling such affairs.”80  This is different from international 
practice, which holds a trustee liable for the agents’ defaults if he fails to 
exercise care or prudence. In light of these discrepancies, the Trust Law of 
China should be amended to make it better fit with international practice.81 
(c) The Regulations of Duty to Account and Their Uncertainty 
Another duty of the trustee is the duty to keep accurate accounts. 
Legislatively, this done by stipulating that the trustee shall “at regular 
intervals every year, report to the settlor and beneficiary on the 
administration and disposition of the trust property and the income and 
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expenses relating to the property.”82 In charitable trusts, the requirement is 
slightly different: “[t]he trustee shall, at least once a year, make a report on 
the trust business handled and the status of assets disposed of, and upon 
acceptance by the trust supervisor, the report shall be submitted to the public 
welfare administration authority for examination and approval, and the 
trustee shall announce the report.” 83  In applying these provisions, 
uncertainty arises as to the consequences of the trustee’s failure to discharge 
such duties. Currently, the only route to obtain remedies for breaches of 
these duties is to see whether the breaches are falling into the duty regulated 
by article 22 – improper handling of trust affairs or breach of his 
management responsibilities. If yes, the trustee is obliged to restore the trust 
property to its original state or to pay compensation if loss is caused by the 
breach.84 If no, the result is unclear. Therefore, in order to offer greater 
clarity to potential beneficiaries, Chinese law ought to be amended based on 
comparative studies of other jurisdictions and entitle a beneficiary or a 
settlor the right to compel a trustee to render accounts when the trustee 
refuses to do so, or to appoint an independent professional or the court to 
prepare the trust accounts while all relevant costs are borne by the defaulting 
trustee.85 
 
2. Trustee’s Rights 
 
This section indicates the rights of the trustee under the Trust Law of 
China. It analyses the right to remuneration and the right of indemnity, and 
examines current limitations of existing regulations. Finally, it proposes 
amendments to these regulations. 
The only benefit that a trustee can anticipate from the management of 
trust property is remuneration.86 After the termination of trusts, the trustee is 
entitled to two means of redress to exercise the right to request remuneration 
from the trust property: “he may have a lien on the property or raise the 
request to the owner of the property”.87 However, this regulation causes a 
number of problems: first, a Chinese lien can only be established over 
movable property.88 The trustee however, could lose this statutory protection 
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if the trust property happens to be real property. In addition, the Chinese 
concept of lien requires the creditor to be in physical possession of the 
property.89 This could cause practical difficulties for a Chinese trustee who 
may not often be given possession of the property in question. Therefore, it 
is doubtful whether the imposition of the lien offers the Chinese trustee the 
same protection as that enjoyed by a common law trustee. In this light, 
amendments to the Chinese law have been proposed in order to remove 
restrictions on the type of trust property. Further suggestions advance the 
notion that the lien of the trustee should be expanded to real estate. Finally, 
commentators argue that the trustee ought to be entitled to obtain priority 
repayment from the value of the property as determined by valuation or from 
the proceeds of sale by auction of the property upon the termination of 
trust.90  
In addition to the right of remuneration, the trustee also has a right of 
indemnity. Where the trustee effects a payment owed to a third party during 
the course of discharging his duties as administrator of the trust’s business in 
advance with his personal property, he has the right to be paid in priority 
with the trust’s properties. Any remaining debts in this circumstance would 
be borne by the trust property.91 However, a preliminary question to ask is 
whether the expenses or liabilities are properly incurred or not. According to 
article 37, the trustee will not be indemnified if the debts owed to a third 
party or the losses suffered by the trustee are “as a result of his departure 
from his administrative duties or his improper handling of trust business”.92 
With respect to this regulation, Professor Ho argues that it is too vague to be 
of much use. Moreover, she states that the wording of article 37 should be 
interpreted broadly to refer to “any breach of the trustee’s duties as set out in 
the Trust Law and in the trust instrument”.93 Even with this said, article 37 
is still more stringent than the approach adopted in international practice. For 
example, English case law allows a trustee who acts in good faith to be 
indemnified to the extent that the unauthorized act benefits the trust estate,94 
or where such an act was expressly or impliedly consented to by the 
beneficiaries. 
Moreover, another problem is that in order to secure the trustee’s right 
of indemnity, article 37 grants the trustee the right to obtain priority 
repayment from the trust fund; however, article 37 lacks an explanation of 
the nature of such a right and how it compares with security interest. In 
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Chinese law, the rights of priority repayment, as opposed to security rights, 
are rights over debts that are specially protected by laws and regulations. 
There is an overwhelming opinion within Chinese doctrine that the nature of 
the right of priority repayment articulated in article 37 is the right to obtain 
payment from the trust fund, and ranks ahead of the rights of all secured and 
unsecured creditors.95 Support for this argument can be found in an opinion 
of the Supreme People’s Court on article 286 of the Contract Law of China, 
which grants similar right of priority repayment for the price of construction 
projects and clarifies that such a right ranks ahead of mortgage rights and 
other rights over debts.96 
 
3. Trustee’s Powers 
 
In addition to the above-listed rights, the trustee holds powers over the 
trust property. He holds these powers in order to enable the management and 
administration of the trust to the same extent as an absolute owner. However, 
there is no such granting of power to be found in the Trust Law of China. 
The only article that mentions the trustee’s powers of administration is 
article 2. When defining the notion of trust, this article stipulates, in very 
broad terms, that the trustee is entrusted the settlor’s property rights and is 
allowed to administer or dispose of the trust property in his own name. 
However, there is no provision that clearly regulates what specific powers 
the trustee should have, or whether it simply embraces the power to maintain 
the trust property or also involves the power to invest, lease or insure 
relevant properties. This is an enormous gap, and requires an amendment to 
the regulation of trustee’s powers. 
Another amendment that needs to be made is to the Chinese regulation 
of the variation of trust administration in article 21 and article 69. It is 
submitted that these provisions should be revised in order to provide 
maximum flexibility for the administration of trusts. As Professor Ho 
suggests, “the requirement of the occurrence of unforeseeable circumstances 
can be abandoned; it could simply be stated that the method for 
administering the trust could be varied if it is in the interest of the 
beneficiaries as a whole.” 97  Since there is no express provision that 
regulates whether articles 21 and 69 are permissive or mandatory, a 
clarification should be added that the statuary powers under those two 
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articles can be overridden by express provisions in the trust instrument. The 
Trust Law of China is unique in giving the settlor the power to vary the 
administration of the trust without any judicial scrutiny in article 21 and to 
adversely change the entitlement of the beneficiaries in article 51. 
Amendments are also needed to these regulations so as to properly protect 
the beneficiaries’ interests and to prevent the settlor from abusing the trust.98 
In short, a comparison of the regulations of rights and obligations of the 
settlor as well as the duties imposed on the trustee by the Trust Law of China 
reveal that the Chinese provisions are broadly similar to those found in 
common law. However, and in contrast to the common law, Chinese law 
does not seek to preserve the independent discretion of the trustee in acting 
in a manner that he considers to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries.99 
 
C. The Capacity and Rights of the Beneficiary 
 
In the Trust Law of China, the beneficiary is defined as “the person that 
enjoys the right to benefit from a trust. He may be a natural person, legal 
person or an organization established according to law”.100 Unlike in the 
case of settlors and trustees, beneficiaries need not have civil capacity, which 
means infants and unincorporated organizations that do not have legal 
personalities can be beneficiaries. Furthermore, and consistent with 
international practice, both settlors and trustees can be beneficiaries. In this 
case however, the trustee/beneficiary may not be the only trustee. There is no 
provision outlining whether the beneficiary should exist at the time of the 
trust’s formation. However considering that there is no problem should a 
beneficiary be absent prior to the distribution of trust benefit, the existence 
of a beneficiary upon the creation of trust does not seem to be required as 
long as the beneficiary can be identified during the trust’s duration. This 
complies with the both trust’s purpose and with Anglo-American law.101  
Knowing the capacity of the beneficiaries, we can now discuss the rights 
of the beneficiaries. According to the statute, beneficiaries are entitled to 
“benefit from a trust beginning from the date the trust becomes effective, 
unless otherwise stipulated in the trust documents.”102 In the event that the 
beneficiary “cannot repay the matured debts, his right to benefit from a trust 
may be used to repay the debts, except this is restricted by provisions in 
laws, administrative regulations and trust documents.”103 As Professor Ho 
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notes, “in this way, the [Chinese] Trust Law permits the creation of 
American-style spendthrift trusts or English-style protective trusts, which 
aim at making appropriate provisions to the beneficiaries, but which also 
restrict them from disposing of the property as they wish.”104 It is worth 
noting that the beneficiaries can dispose of this right to benefit: according to 
article 46, they may either give up this right or instead transfer the right. In 
the case of co-beneficiaries, according to article 45, “the co-beneficiaries 
shall enjoy the benefits from a trust according to the provisions in the trust 
documents. Where no percentage or methods for distribution of the benefits 
from the trust are specified in the documents, all the beneficiaries shall enjoy 
the benefits equally.”105  Compared to the common law approach, this 
Chinese provision is less stringent because it does not require the certainty of 
beneficiary’s share and allows this to be cured by equal division.106 
In addition to the right to benefit, beneficiaries can also claim against 
the trustees pursuant to article 49. This article states that beneficiaries “may 
exercise the rights that the settlor enjoys as stipulated in article 20 through 
23.”107 This means that the beneficiary retains not only the right to use and 
dispose of assets in the trust, as well as the income and expenses relating to 
his trust property, but also that he has the right to check the trust account, ask 
the trustees to modify their administration, apply to the People’s Court for 
annulling trustee’s improper disposition, ask the trustee to restore the 
property, or even dismiss the trustee according to the provisions in the trust 
documents or by application to the People’s Court. Moreover, the 
beneficiaries are given powers, again along with the settlor, to help fill gaps 
in the trust instrument and to facilitate the smooth administration of the trust. 
In other words, in the absence of provision in the trust instrument, the 
beneficiaries can give consent to transactions conducted by the trustee 
between his own property and trust assets at fair market price,108 resolve 
disagreement between joint trustees in the administration of trust,109 give 
consent to the trustee’s resignation,110 and approve the report submitted by 
the trustee on his administration of the trust upon the termination of the trust 
in certain circumstance.111 Additionally, the beneficiary is entitled to appoint 
another person as the trustee where the person designated in a testament 
                                                                                                                            
 104. HO, supra note 24, at 117-18; see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Touzi 
Jijin Fa (中华人民共和国证券投资基金法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities 
Investment Funds] § 15, it appears that the Trust Law of China does not permit self-settled spendthrift 
trust, which involve the settlor as the sole beneficiary or a co-beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. 
 105. Trust Law of China § 45. 
 106. HSIAO, supra note 31, at 234. 
 107. Trust Law of China § 49. 
 108. Id. § 28. 
 109. Id. § 31. 
 110. Id. § 38. 
 111. Id. § 41. 
2015] Trust Law of China and Its Uncertainties 65 
 
refuses or is unable to act as a trustee pursuant to article 13,112 and to 
appoint a new trustee when the trustee’s appointment is terminated 
according to article 40.113 However, Professor Ho denies the wisdom of 
those two provisions. As she argues “[allowing] a beneficiary to appoint a 
trustee is to ignore the need for maintaining the crucial check and balance 
between the trustee and the beneficiaries.”114 
However, the beneficiary’s role in the trust relationship in China is 
significantly different when compared to its common law counterpart. Apart 
from the right to receive distribution, the beneficiary’s entitlements to 
monitor the trustee and bring actions for breach are granted by way of 
duplication of the settlor’s rights, as discussed earlier. Such duplication 
suggests that the administration of the Chinese trust will be shadowed by the 
conflicting interests between the settlor and the beneficiaries: given the lack 
of statutory guidance in the law as to whose interests should take priority, 
there is a great risk that under the current legal regime beneficiary’s rights 
could be encroached upon by settlors. Admittedly, this might not be the case 
in the investment trusts so are prevalent in China in which investors are both 
settlors and beneficiaries. However, the issue could become prominent if 
other trusts that are not alter ego trusts, such as family trusts, were to take off 
in China.115 
After outlining the regulations of settlor rights and obligations, as well 
as those of trustees and beneficiaries, the Trust Law of China prescribes the 
termination of trusts and the charitable trusts in the following chapters.  
 
III. MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE CHINESE TRUST SYSTEM 
 
After offering a detailed examination of the provisions of the Trust Law 
of China, this section concludes by examining the significant limitations of 
the Chinese trust system. In addition to the gaps and overlaps of the 
regulations of the rights and obligations of trust parties, the biggest problem 
of the Trust Law of China is that it avoids dealing with the key issue of the 
ownership of trust property. As a consequence, the Trust Law of China 
causes renders ambiguous the ownership of trust property and unclear nature 
of beneficiary’s rights.116 
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A. Ambiguous Ownership of Trust Property 
 
In contrast to dual ownership under common law, ownership in China is 
absolute and indivisible, as it is in most civilian jurisdictions. Therefore, the 
ownership of trust property is a serious problem in the introduction of trusts 
in China. Regrettably, Chinese legislation has remained silent on this issue. 
There is neither direct reception of dual ownership nor clear stipulation of 
unitary ownership in the Trust Law of China; and the Supreme People’s 
Court of China issued no judicial interpretation in relation to this issue. 
Instead, academics hold different opinions on the ownership of trust 
property. As a result, the lack of clarity and contending theorists creates 
ambiguity. This is reflected by both statutory ambiguity and interpretation 
ambiguity. 
 
1. Statutory Ambiguity 
 
Article 2 of the Trust Law of China regulates that:  
 
[F]or purposes of this Law, a trust refers to that the settlor, 
based on his faith in trustee, entrusts his property rights to the 
trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of the 
settlor and in the name of the trustee, administer or dispose of 
such property in the interest of a beneficiary or for any 
intended purposes.117 
 
Instead of adopting the term of “transfer” that is used in common law, 
this article chooses the expression of “entrust” (委托) the property to 
describe the relationship between a settlor and a trustee. However, in 
Chinese law, “entrust” is not a unique legal term used to describe a trust 
relationship. On the contrary, it is typically adopted in agency relationships 
or in mandates, where the transfer of property is not required.118 Therefore, 
use of the term of “entrust” blurs the line between the trust and agency, 
causing the misunderstanding which incorrectly holds that that trusts do not 
require transfer of trust property. 
Fittingly the vague term “entrust” leaves open the question of the 
ownership of trust property, which, as it so happens, remains unanswered by 
                                                                                                                            
 117. Trust Law of China § 2. 
 118. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongtze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [General 
Principle of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] § 64; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国合同法) [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm’ Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), 1999(2) 
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the Trust Law of China. This seems almost deliberate: the Trust Law of 
China consistently adopts ambiguous expressions in its constituent parts 
which indicate either laxness in drafting, or more likely, confusion as the 
nature of ownership. For example, article 14 states that “[t]he property 
obtained by the trustee due to a trust accepted is trust property”.119 The 
expression of “obtains” (取得) seems to recognize the transfer of ownership; 
however, the same term “obtain” is also used in agency law to refer to the 
agent’s acquisition of possession, as opposed to ownership of relevant 
property.120 Similarly, article 16 provides that “[t]he trust property shall be 
segregated from the property owned by the trustee”.121 Such a drafting 
seems to imply that a trustee is the owner of trust property, whereas article 
15, by contrast, adopts the same stipulation for settlors. 
Moreover, the Trust Law of China avoids saying that settlors and 
trustees are co-owner of the trust property, and refrains from distinguishing 
when these two provisions would apply.122 Specifically, articles 15 and 16 
seem to only aim at imposing the duty of segregating trust property from 
personal property on the settlor and the trustee instead of authorizing them 
the ownership of trust property. Support for this opinion can be found in the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds, 
which stipulates that “fund property shall be independent from the property 
owned by the fund manager and fund trustee”123 while only the fund trustee 
but not the fund manager owns the fund assets. 
In addition, pursuant to article 9 of the Trust Law of China, whether the 
transfer of ownership takes place seems to depend on the terms of the trust 
contract or decisions made by the settlors when there are no such terms 
regulated in the trust contract. The article stipulates that: 
 
[T]he following items shall be stated clearly in the written 
documents required for the creation of a trust: 
  . . . 
  (4) the scope, types and status of the assets under trust; 
and 
  . . . 
In addition to the items mentioned above, the period of the 
trust, the methods for the administration of the property under 
trust, remuneration payable to the trustee, manner for 
                                                                                                                            
 119. Trust Law of China § 14. 
 120. Rebecca Lee, Conceptualizing the Chinese Trust, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 655, 660 (2009). 
 121. Trust Law of China § 16. 
 122. Ho, supra note 2, at 195. 
 123. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Touzi Jijin Fa (中华人民共和国证券投资基金
法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds] § 6. 
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appointing another trustee, the cause for termination of the 
trust, etc. may be stated clearly.124 
 
2. Interpretation Ambiguity 
 
Not only is legislation silent on the issue of the transfer of ownership, 
neither legislative interpretation nor judicial interpretation clarifies whether 
the term “entrust” could be interpreted as “transfer”. The Supreme People’s 
Court has issued no judicial interpretation on the Trust Law of China. 
Although other People’s Courts have interpreted “entrust” in relation to the 
ownership of trust property, these decisions unfortunately lack the effect of 
legal interpretation because precedents are not a source of law and do not 
bind subsequent case decisions in China. Further difficulties arise given that 
certain case decisions either bypass the Trust Law of China or stand in 
conflict with it. For instance, in Beijing Haidian Science & Technology 
Development Co. Ltd v Shenzhen Xinhua Jinyuan Touzi Fazhan Youxian 
Gongsi and Others,125 the Higher People’s Court of Chongqing rejected the 
argument that the trustee is the owner of trust property and held that either 
the settlor or the beneficiary was, or even both of them were, the owner of 
the trust property. It stated that either the settlor or the beneficiary had the 
right to bring action in a title dispute against a third party over the trust 
property. The trustee, as a titular owner, does not have a direct interest in a 
title dispute. So pursuant to article 108(1) of the Civil Procedure Law of 
China, he or she can only participate in the litigation as a third party but is 
not able to make any title claim against a third party. Similar views can be 
found in Yanxin Co Ltd v Huabao Trust and Investment Co Ltd. However, 
the Trust Law of China, even article 2, never denies a trustee to be the owner 
of trust property. Significantly, these cases are not an aberration of the 
People’s Courts’ perception of the trust, but are evidence that the trust is 
conceptualized as a subspecies of contract in China. The Courts had no 
difficulty invoking the Contract Law of China to characterize the assignment 
of rights and obligations, both internal and external, of trust parties.126 
 
                                                                                                                            
 124. Trust Law of China § 9. 
 125. Beijing Haidian Keji Fazhan Youxian Gongsi Su Shenzhenshi Xinhua Jinyuan Touzi Fazhan 
Youxian Gongsi Deng (北京海淀科技发展有限公司訴深圳市新华锦源投资发展有限公司等) 
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3.  Reasons for the Vague Regulation of the Chinese Law and Its 
Problems 
 
The Chinese regulation of trust ownership, neither preventing a trustee 
from obtaining the ownership nor mandating that the settlor shall be the 
owner, is a deviation from international practice. It is not only different from 
the common law rules, but also alien to its neighboring civil law jurisdictions 
(i.e. Japan).127 Although the Hague Trust Convention does not require the 
transfer of a trust asset in its article 2, it still provides that the asset be held 
under the control of the trustee. China’s unique approach is the result of a 
last-minute change, since all the earlier drafts of the law contemplate the 
transfer of the settlor’s property to the trustees.128 
Questions may arise as to why the Chinese legislature chose to adopt 
vague expressions rather than use the term “transfer”. One reason lies in the 
concern that once the ownership was clearly vested in the hand of the 
trustee, the trustee’s rights might become over expanded and consequently 
the settlors’ right to supervise the management of the trust would be affected. 
Unlike common law ownership, ownership in China is absolute and 
indivisible. Therefore, in the drafters’ perspective, the choice of the term 
“entrust”, as opposed to “transfer”, was not an oversight. Professor Jiang 
Ping, the Trust Law of China’s main drafter, considered it an innovation of 
the Chinese law to leave open the issue of the location of ownership. In his 
opinion, the Trust Law of China only needed to provide that a trustee is 
authorized to manage and administer trust properties, so as to draw an 
adequate balance between the need to grant trustees the right to dispose of 
trust property and to protect beneficiaries’ rights. Moreover, because most of 
the trusts established in China aim to be collective investment schemes, the 
investors would transfer their investment to the trustees anyway, therefore 
the drafters do not think it urgent to entitle the ownership of trust property to 
the trustees.129 For the purposes of collective investments then, studied 
vagueness was at least appropriate, or, in the circumstances not as 
inappropriate as it would later become. 
Yet because the trust is no longer restricted to collective investment, 
studied ambiguity can no longer suffice. Therefore, in order to adapt to the 
rapid development of the trust and its broad application in China, 
amendments to the regulation of ownership in the Trust Law of China are 
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 128. Id. at 66-67; see also Trust Law of China article 3 (in the 1996 and 2000 drafts) requires the 
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required. Rather than resolving the concerns of the drafters, these vague 
expressions work against drafter’s intention to entitle the trust management 
to the trustee and to equally protect the beneficiaries’ interests. Instead, 
vagueness leaves room for settlors to choose whether to transfer the 
ownership to their trustees. However, because settlors are usually reluctant to 
relinquish their ownership of property to a stranger-trustee if no enforceable 
obligation is imposed, settlors are likely to abuse such ambiguity in order to 
retain the ownership of trust property in contravention of the original design 
of the trust. 
In the absence of a clear entitlement of trust property therefore, the 
balance of interests between trust parties is destroyed and the efficiency of 
trust management is decreased. As Professor Ho said: “the absence of 
ownership will significantly limit the trustee’s powers to act in his own name 
as envisaged by the Trust Law, and this will limit in turn the convenience 
that a trust relationship is supposed to bring.”130 Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how a trustee can obtain any independent control of the trust property and 
manage efficient trust administration without having the ownership of 
property. The settlor’s retention of the ownership requires the trustee to seek 
the settlor’s consent and cooperation in every disposition of the trust 
property. Additionally, the Trust Law of China grants considerable powers to 
the settlor to monitor the trustee.131 Should the trustee sets up hurdles in 
order to safeguard the trustees’ management of trust assets, there is a great 
risk that the settlor might misappropriate the trust contrary to the terms of the 
trust, unbeknownst to the trustee. In such cases, the redresses available to the 
beneficiaries may at best be theoretical and at worst nonexistent. Given that 
none of the provisions of the Trust Law of China imposes any specific duties 
on a settlor to segregate trust property, observe the terms of the trust or to 
refrain from misappropriating trust property the beneficiary may find himself 
bereft of legal benefit. Even such provisions were to exist for beneficiaries, 
the Trust Law of China does not provide any remedies for breach by the 
settlor. Moreover, no provision is made in the Chinese law for the 
replacement of settlors. Consequently, if a settlor, the apparent owner of trust 
property, dies, the trust assets will be left in a sort of legal limbo given that 
the trust assets do not fall to the settlor’s heirs according to article 15. 
Likewise, questions will arise as to “under whose name the trust assets 
should be registered, to whom tax liabilities should be charged, and who has 
the title to sue upon torts infringing the ownership rights over the assets”.132  
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B. Outstanding Characteristic of the Beneficiary’s Right 
 
A beneficiary holds “equitable ownership” under the dual ownership of 
common law. How to interpret this ownership and what is the nature of a 
beneficiary’s right has been a key issue of the introduction of trusts in China. 
Unfortunately, like the issue of trust ownership, the Chinese legislation again 
adopts an evasive nomenclature, which makes the nature of the beneficiary’s 
rights another unresolved difficult to pin down. 
As discussed, the Trust Law of China provides that a beneficiary is 
entitled to benefit from a trust. It also establishes that this right is assignable 
and inheritable, and extends to exchange products lawfully or unlawfully 
obtained by the trustee and still held in his hands. Moreover, the beneficiary 
has the right to ask the trustee to adjust the methods of management of trust 
property, and to apply to the People’s Court to annul the trustee’s disposition 
of trust property, as well as to ask the trustee to restore the property to its 
former state or make compensation. In other words, the beneficiary has the 
right to enjoy the trust benefits and can claim against trustees or exclude 
third parties’ interference by annulling trustees’ wrongful disposition. 
However, there is no explicit provision in the Trust Law of China that 
regulates the nature of the beneficiary’s rights. It does not indicate whether 
the right to claim against trustees and the right to exclude interference from 
third parties are in the essence of real rights or personal claims. What makes 
this “vacuum” of legislation more complex is that various theories arise to 
interpret the nature of the beneficiary’s rights in academia. For instance, the 
theory of real rights states that trustees’ legal ownership is only a right of 
management, while the beneficiary’s equitable ownership is the real title.133 
In contrast, the theory of personal claim posits that the beneficiary’s right is 
in the nature of a debt. Equitable ownership would thus entitle the 
beneficiary to personal claims against trustees. As a compromise of the 
foregoing two theories, the theory of co-existing real rights and personal 
claim takes the position that the beneficiary’s right has the dual nature of a 
personal claim against trustees and a real right over trust property.134 In 
addition, a novel theory, termed as special right theory, simply defines the 
beneficiary’s rights as a special right due to the difficulties in fully 
integrating it into either real rights or a personal claim.135 Likewise, some 
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commentators describe the beneficiary’s right as a trust property right (信托
财产权) which is an independent civil right similar to intellectual property 
rights and rights over shares.136 However, as with the special right theory, 
there is little room under the present Chinese law to accommodate a new 
type of right. 
In short, while the Trust Law of China took the bold step of 
incorporating the trust into China and shed lights on the introduction of 
trusts in civilian jurisdictions, much more work needs to be done for it to 
work properly. The law avoids the key issue of ownership of trust property 
and has instead succeeded in introducing the trust as a species of contract 
subject to pre-existing contractual statutes. Ambiguities in the statute’s 
wording have created considerable hurdles for lawyers trying to understand 
the nature of the beneficiary’s rights, businessmen trying to efficiently 
manage the trust, and those tasked with safeguarding the independent 
exercise of discretion of the trustee. As is stands, the Trust Law of China is a 
piece of broad and general legislation with gaps and ambiguities to be 
fleshed out in the course of the development of a more comprehensive legal 
and regulatory regime for the trust.137 Clearly, work remains to be done: 
since its promulgation in 2001, the Trust Law of China has never been 
amended and all the regulations of trust companies stay at the level of CBRC 
regulations rather than administrative regulations of the State Council.138 As 
a result, the Chinese rules of trust fall behind the development of trust 
business.139 In consideration of all the uncertainties of the Chinese trust law 
discussed in this paper, it is necessary and important to propose amendments 
to the Chinese trust law, in particular to propose a better understanding of 
trust ownership in China. Using an analysis that focuses on comparing 
function, rather than form, the author believes that the concept of dual 
ownership is not an obstacle to the introduction of the trust in China and the 
key to understanding the interpretations of dual ownership is through an 
explanation that can be called the “binary system of real rights and personal 
claims”. On this approach, the common law’s legal ownership corresponds 
to a civilian trustee’s unitary ownership in real rights, and the common law’s 
equitable ownership corresponds to a special kind of personal claim. 
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中國信託法及其局限：信託權利 
義務及信託財產所有權問題研究 
張 芮 僑 
摘 要  
為基於信託在投資、銀行、金融和財產管理領域的優勢，中國大
膽得引進了信託制度。作為英美法系衡平法的產物，信託制度被視為
中國法的異類，尤其與一物一權的中國物權體系格格不入。因此，中
國引進信託法的道路崎嶇但最終於2001年頒布了中華人民共和國信
託法。然而此法迴避了信託財產所有權認定這個基本問題並由此導致
了一系列具體法律規定上的漏洞，例如所有權制度模糊和受益人權利
不確定。此文在研究中國信託歷史發展和信託產業法律整頓的基礎
上，對中華人民共和國信託法相關規定及其主要問題進行分析。 
 
關鍵詞： 中華人民共和國信託法、信託法的相關問題、信託當事人
的權利義務、信託財產、中國信託的歷史發展 
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